

the United Nations Emergency Force by the Secretary-General; civil war in the Dominican Republic and massive intervention by military forces of the United States; the resumption of hostilities between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Cutch and Kashmir and at other points along their common border in the west; and the precarious position of the United Nations force in Cyprus in the face of threatened renewal of international hostilities in that troubled island. Toward the end of the period, the Secretary-General bemoaned the fact that the "international political situation has not only not improved; it has in fact deteriorated considerably."

It was the time also when the UN General Assembly was victimized, nearly immobilized, by great power controversy over the financing of peacekeeping. Behind that lay the struggle of the titans over global ascendancy. In the United Nations argument over the implementation of Article 19 of the Charter, the Soviet Union demonstrated that it was able to deny the United States the goal it sought. In United Nations terms that was important. The Secretary-General is recorded more than once in these pages as regretting the result that the financing of future peacekeeping could be only voluntary, as exemplified by the Cyprus precedent. More significant was the fact that the issue in the UN, and its outcome, accurately reflected—indeed, it symbolized—the shifting balance of global power and the attendant changes in the capacities for world leadership.

The documents in this volume, comprising selected state papers, speeches and press conferences of the Secretary-General, amply represent U Thant's frustration over the situation so well symbolized by the Article 19 controversy. The record of his impotence in the face of the principal parties' commitment to the Vietnam War is here. So is his embattled defense of his decision to withdraw UNEF in response to Egypt's request that it be withdrawn. These pages record how reluctant U Thant was in the circumstances to be elected to a second term as Secretary-General. It is not surprising that the tone of his message was gloomy and his prognosis pessimistic when he addressed the meeting in San Francisco to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations. As he made clear on that occasion, he found it difficult to reconcile his somewhat ascetic idealism with a world of power politics: "The concept of power politics, whether as the instrument of nationalism or of ideological extremism, is the natural enemy of international order as envisaged in the Charter." Some

at least of those who had participated in the founding conference 20 years earlier might not have agreed that the "international order" of the charter was intended to be that remote from the world of power politics.

U Thant's perception may have been faulty and his pessimism excessive. Detente did not succumb to Vietnam. Great power rivalry has not yet led to Armageddon nor has it prevented the apparent emergence of a will to peace among some at least of the primary parties in the Middle East. U Thant's impatience with the great powers is understandable for a native of a small power strongly moved by Buddhist ideals. It is not clear that his outlook ideally suited him to optimize the effective leadership of his office, even within the narrow limits of what was feasible.

The period covered by these papers was a time of other emergent themes. Although the editors' selection emphasized the issues of war and peace, there are glimmerings also of the new agendas which have come to predominate in the affairs of a United Nations denied a more central role with respect to the old ones. There are reflections in these papers of U Thant's passionate concern for poverty and inequity in the world, his understanding of the relevance of population issues and his enthusiasm for the beginnings of UN programs in this realm, and his sympathetic support for the mobilization of effective forces to alter the balance of racial power in southern Africa. The United Nations Development Programme was formed during this period, out of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund which had preceded it, and U Thant correctly heralded the significance of this change. The three introductions to his annual reports chronicle the emergence of UNCTAD and UNIDO as instruments for projecting the goals of developing countries in their efforts to attract support and sympathetic policies by the developed ones.

Altogether, the selections give a well-balanced picture of U Thant's utterances. The editors have provided succinct and very helpful summaries of the main issues.

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The Dynamics of Detente: How to End the Arms Race. By Arthur Macy Cox. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. Pp. 256. \$8.95.)

This book claims to be a road map for ending the arms race. It covers the broad scope

of U.S.-Soviet relations, including SALT, Europe, economic factors and the clandestine battle between the CIA and the KGB. Unfortunately, the book contains far more wishful thinking than realistic blueprints. The arms race and cold war are deeply rooted aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. They will not be altered easily and certainly not by the simplistic prescriptions suggested by Arthur Macy Cox.

This book has a legion of deficiencies. But space only permits a limited catalog of its errors of fact and questionable analysis. In claiming that the Soviet Backfire bomber was raised by the U.S. in SALT-II as a ploy and not a serious issue, Cox states: "The Backfire was not even mentioned prior to the Vladivostok talks because it was generally considered to be a medium-range bomber designed to attack targets in Western Europe and Asia, as well as shipping near the Soviet Union, according to civilian and military officials in the Pentagon" (p. 92). In fact, the Backfire was a major issue within the U.S. bureaucracy during SALT-I. It was repeatedly considered in SALT proposals and there were sharp disagreements between civilian and military intelligence analysts over the range and capability of the Backfire and its potential against the U.S. In fact, for several years it was one of the two or three most heated issues in the annual intelligence estimate of Soviet forces. It was also raised with the Soviets a number of times during the SALT-I negotiations, but was not made a major issue by the U.S. since bombers were set aside during SALT-I and not included in the limitations.

In a section arguing for an ambitious SALT-II agreement, Cox states that if the U.S. gave up on its goal of strategic superiority and agreed to parity with the Soviets, savings of \$25 billion per year would be possible (p. 96). In fact, the total direct cost of our strategic forces is only \$15 billion and if support and training costs are allocated, the total only rises to \$25 billion. Thus, it is difficult to envisage the savings Cox suggests unless both sides were to fully phase out their strategic forces.

In his assessment of Soviet SALT goals, Cox states that General Secretary Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership are willing to negotiate significant limits on strategic forces and reductions in numbers of weapons if only the U.S. were willing (p. 81). Yet when President Carter made a proposal of this nature in the spring of 1977, it was turned down flatly by the Soviet leadership and attacked bitterly by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. There are many other similar assertions regarding Soviet willingness to agree to significant arms control mea-

sures that would likely suffer a similar response if pushed strongly by U.S. leaders.

In a section discussing the need for a valid U.S. strategic concept, Cox badly distorts the changes to strategic policy advocated by former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, calling it a "counterforce" doctrine. While Schlesinger called for a modest amount of "hard target" capability for use in certain limited situations, he did not advocate building up the type of preemptive, first-strike capability that Cox implies was the heart of his strategy (pp. 85-89).

The main thrust of the book (and about half of its material) is related to strategic forces and SALT. But Cox also covers conventional arms competition, clandestine operations (the best section of the book), and the economics of detente in the U.S. There are occasional useful parts, but the book suffers from a lack of realism that seriously undermines its conclusions and recommendations.

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Interpreters for Nigeria: The Third World and International Public Relations. By Morris Davis. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977. Pp. 197. \$10.00.)

This book reviews the activities of nine public relations firms hired not by the Third World but by component elements of the Federation of Nigeria. Of the six substantive chapters, one presents firms employed by the eastern and western regions and the federal government between 1957 and 1964; another does the same for the period 1966-67; and two chapters each review firms employed by the federal military and the Biafran governments. Much of the book covers minutiae, but it deserves careful attention for what it illuminates and suggests.

The style of the hired professionals varied according to client needs and preferences. Biafra, whose aim was to change government policy through popular outcries, opted for a "brash" approach (a bumper sticker distributed in Britain read "Put a Dead Biafran in Your Tank," referring to oil companies which were indirectly financing the war). The federal government, whose targets were government and other elites whose policy it supported, chose the "decorous" approach of low-key communications. Target audiences in both cases ranged from legislators to officials of the executive branch, private and special interest